The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the NPT extension in 1995 by Onderco, M. (Michal)
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rinh20
The International History Review
ISSN: 0707-5332 (Print) 1949-6540 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rinh20
The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and the NPT Extension
Michal Onderco
To cite this article: Michal Onderco (2019): The Programme for Promoting Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and the NPT Extension, The International History Review, DOI:
10.1080/07075332.2019.1631204
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2019.1631204
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 23 Jun 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 348
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
the NPT Extension
Michal Onderco,a,b
aDepartment of Public Administration and Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands; bCenter for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, California, USA
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I study the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (PPNN), which provided the prime platform for discussing
matters of nuclear non-proliferation starting from the 1980s up until the
late 1990s. Using newly available archival materials, as well as private
papers from the group’s key participants, the paper illuminates the case
of the PPNN as a specific platform for the creation and spread of non-pro-
liferation knowledge. The paper also analyses methods for spreading such
knowledge, and demonstrates how the group functioned from within.
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Introduction
In 1995, the global non-proliferation regime was at a critical juncture. The Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970. As Article X.2 of the treaty
specified, “twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be con-
vened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for
an additional fixed period or periods.”1 The conference, due to take place in spring 1995, was
supposed to decide on the length of the extension. The length of the extension was the defining
debate in the field of nuclear non-proliferation in the early 1990s; the discussions about it ani-
mated the debates from the late 1980s till 1995.2
In 1986, Ben Sanders and John Simpson founded the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (PPNN), an organization that had a seemingly simple goal: making sure that the dip-
lomats, who were to take part in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC),
could make an informed decision. For great powers, such as the United States and Russia, it is
easy to ensure that the diplomats taking part in meetings such as NPT Review Conferences
(RevCons) are well prepared, as they often specialize on a certain dossier for decades, sometimes
for their whole careers.3 If needed, such diplomats are assisted by expert advisors who have in-
depth knowledge of minute technical details. For smaller countries, such as Lithuania or
Malaysia, however, this is much harder to ensure. Diplomats often deal with dossiers only for a
short time, and frequently switch portfolios. While most countries, regardless of size, provide
general diplomatic training to their diplomats,4 almost none provides training in specific expert-
ise related to nuclear proliferation. Yet it is exactly the smaller and poorer countries that are
most in need of it. While larger countries are able to send big delegations to international
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conferences, smaller and poorer countries might not be able to draw on large pools of experts
and send them on extended trips to expensive conference venues, such as New York or Geneva.
The solution, proposed by the PPNN, was to create a platform where diplomats who enter
the field could find a one-stop-shop of information about the NPT. During the years of its activ-
ity, the PPNN provided a platform for a core group of experts to meet regularly and discuss
developments in nuclear politics, but more importantly, it provided a platform for diplomats
from countries across the world to learn the ins and outs of the NPT, and meet their counter-
parts from other countries. Through conferences on four continents, the PPNN helped to inform
but also provide a network for diplomats from dozens of countries. The fact that the story of the
PPNN is little known even to experts in nuclear proliferation5 suggests both that the case study
is worth studying, but more importantly that the role of such groups often happens “under
the radar”.
The PPNN developed two main vehicles to spread information: publications and conferences.
The publications included a quarterly Newsbrief, which was meant as a current affairs overview,
and more occasional publications conceptualized more in-depth treatments of particular issues.
Publications kept diplomats from over 117 countries abreast of the most recent developments in
the world of nuclear non-proliferation. The conferences were organized both regionally (pre-
1995) and internationally, making it possible for diplomats to interact with one another across
the existing political lines. At the conferences, diplomats learned from leading experts about the
technical details of nuclear politics and heard extensive presentations on the mechanisms of
extension as well as on the NPT’s institutional background. The conferences provided a venue
for the Conference President Jayantha Dhanapala to meet fellow diplomats, but also ascertain
their views in more detail. As leaders of Russian, American, Dutch and British delegations to the
1995 NPT RevCon admitted in the critical oral history conference which took place in Rotterdam
in 2018, the PPNN was not an occasion for negotiation, but rather a venue for training
and meetings.6
This paper seeks to make a threefold contribution: firstly, to illuminate the case of the PPNN
as a specific platform for the creation and spread of non-proliferation knowledge in the 1980s
and 1990s; secondly, to analyse the methods used by the PPNN to spread such knowledge; and
thirdly, to demonstrate how such platforms work from within.
The paper falls between the area of the work on transnational activism and the role of grass-
roots networks in nuclear disarmament on one hand7 and the work on epistemic communities
on the other.8 The PPNN was different from the grassroots movements since the participants in
the group were not grassroots activists, yet it was similar in a sense that the group was trans-
national and united in the goal of spreading knowledge of the NPT. The group was also different
from the paradigmatic epistemic communities, since participants in the PPNN were not inter-
ested in persuading others to choose a certain policy, but were primarily interested in the
exchange of expertise.
In the study, I rely on four sources of data: (1) archival documents produced by the PPNN,
moved mainly to the archives of the University of Southampton and accessible there (with add-
itional documents retrieved from the private papers of Ben Sanders)9; (2) the archival documents
about the PPNN, retrieved mainly from the archives of the Ford Foundation, which was an
important funder of the PPNN, stored at the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New
York; (3) correspondence between members of the PPNN, acquired primarily from Sanders’s pri-
vate papers and from the documents stored at the University of Southampton; and (4) oral his-
tory interviews with the group’s leaders as well as other participants in PPNN activities.
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. In the second section, I outline the founda-
tion of the PPNN, with the Core Group as its heart. In the third section, I analyse the PPNN’s
activities, mainly the publications and conferences. The fourth section examines the group’s
transformation after the NPT’s indefinite extension. In the concluding section, I offer a tentative
assessment of the group. As I argue, it is difficult to find indisputable evidence that the PPNN
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changed the course of the history of the non-proliferation regime, but at least three ways can
be charted in which the group paved the way to the NPT’s indefinite extension.
Foundation of the PPNN
The impetus for the foundation of the PPNN came from Ben Sanders, a Dutch diplomat and for-
mer senior IAEA official and UN diplomat, who served in senior roles in the secretariats of 1980
and 1985 NPT RevCons. During these two RevCons, he became concerned that nuclear non-pro-
liferation matters were handled mainly by diplomats who had little substantive knowledge.
Attendees of RevCons were mainly generalist diplomats accredited to Geneva10 “and they didn’t
know a damn – the smallest thing about the nuclear side.”11 The phenomenon Sanders wit-
nessed was not new. As the former Dutch Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament Jaap
Ramaker remembered, during his tenure in Geneva, the Soviet Ambassador Victor Israelyan used
to complain “‘Every year, we have to start all over again’ because half of the diplomats are
new.”12 Sanders’s experience and expertise (combined with the likely fear of boredom in retire-
ment) prompted him to build a project to give diplomats substantive knowledge.
Shortly before retiring from his UN capacity, Sanders met John Simpson, at the time a senior
lecturer at the University of Southampton.13 Simpson had recently gained a grant from the Ford
Foundation for a project on North-South relations and nuclear (non-)proliferation.14 Sanders
found in Simpson someone who shared interest in NPT matters and decided to work with him
to found the PPNN, leveraging Simpson’s institutional base to assure funders of the Programme’s
solid grounding.15
The issue of the Treaty’s extension in 1995 was a key motivating factor, which both Sanders
and Simpson confirmed in oral history interviews.16 At the end of Simpson’s earlier project men-
tioned in the previous paragraph, a year before founding the PPNN, he drafted a memo in which
he argued that “the Treaty appears very fragile [… ] On balance, the probability appears to be
that the Treaty will be extended for a 5-year period.”17 That theme returns in the applications
for the funding, and was clearly tied to the need for spreading substantive knowledge about the
NPT. In the application to the Ford Foundation, Sanders and Simpson outlined that “many of
those attending the most recent conference were struck by the apparent lack of relevant infor-
mation possessed by many of the participants.”18 Arguing that there was as yet no means of
“assuring a continuity of knowledge,”19 Sanders and Simpson proposed a programme “designed
to help provide those involved in the issue of non-proliferation [… ] with a source of authorita-
tive information on the background and evolution of the non-proliferation system and the NPT
and of manifold aspects of their implementation.”20
Beyond this, however, the project had little substantive content.21 The initial programme pro-
posal lists four goals: sustaining interest in the NPT; assisting newcomers in acquiring knowledge
and exchanging views; encouraging research; and providing a “ready source of authoritative fact
on the background, evolution, and implementation” of the NPT.22 The agenda was an expression
of the belief, held by both Simpson and Sanders, that a non-proliferation regime is a cornerstone
of global security, and the recognition that the NPT was the main game in town, without neces-
sarily going into the specifics of how to maintain it.
The scope of the PPNN’s proposed activities required substantial financial backing. The initial
budget for the first 4 years was estimated at $547,000, of which almost half was allocated to the
salaries of Sanders and Simpson, as well as their secretarial support and material costs.23 From
the start – and throughout – the PPNN was funded almost exclusively by private philanthro-
pies24: about one-third came from various funds connected to the Rockefeller family; additional
substantive funding came from the W. Alton Jones Foundation,25 the Ford Foundation and the
MacArthur Foundation.
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Core Group
At the heart of PPNN’s efforts was the Core Group.26 It consisted of core participants (both aca-
demic experts and diplomats), who met biannually to discuss various topics related to nuclear
non-proliferation. At the same time, the Core Group provided the subject experts and principal
lecturers for the conferences for diplomats organized by the PPNN (these were, again, both
experts and fellow diplomats). Explaining why the Core Group was crucial, Sanders wrote
to Simpson:
“from them we must derive our political support, our respectability, and the major part of the information
we must work with. They have political prestige and institutional stature and they are the central ‘nodes’ of
our network. They should be the true ‘core’ of the exercise.”27
At its foundation, the Core Group included 13 participants, the majority of whom were distin-
guished diplomats, among them, Jayantha Dhanapala (at the time the Director of the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR] and future President of the 1995 NPTREC);
David Fischer (former Head of External Affairs at the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]);
Mohamed Shaker (Egyptian diplomat, President of the 1985 NPT RevCon, and author of the sem-
inal work on the NPT negotiations28); and Roland Timerbaev (Soviet diplomat and the Soviet
Union’s principal negotiator on the establishment of the NPT). From the academic side, Jozef
Goldblat, Harald M€uller, and Joseph Nye (due to his experience as Undersecretary of State for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the Carter Administration) participated. This particular constellation
of members representing different geographical areas but also career paths assured that all rele-
vant points of view were represented. For example, the first meeting of the Core Group con-
cluded that a representative of “Black Africa” as well as from Japan should join the group.29
Almost all of the initial members of the group were Sanders’s friends from his earlier career.
While the Core Group constellation did shift, such changes were not frequent in these early years
and usually consisted of the replacement of someone who retired or was no longer interested
with a similar individual. New members were carefully selected; nobody automatically became a
member of the Core Group (e.g. ex officio), and at the same time, the opportunities for
“application for membership” were extremely limited (it appears that only one person ever suc-
cessfully “applied” for membership – Davidson Hepburn, the former Ambassador of the Bahamas
to the UN). Even illustrious scholars and practitioners – such as Lawrence Scheinman – were
turned down.30 In other situations, practitioners were turned down because they were seen as
not fitting with the group. Miguel Marin Bosch, Mexico’s main point of contact on non-prolifer-
ation issues for decades, was not invited to one of the main PPNN meetings, despite the wide-
spread relevance of his personal prominence and his country’s importance, because he was seen
to be more interested in fighting political fights than discussing substantive issues.31
Among those who joined at a later stage were Lewis Dunn, who joined after retiring from his
government functions; and Oleg Grinevsky, a senior Soviet diplomat. After France joined the
NPT, policy advisor Therese Delpech became a member; after China became a member, senior
diplomat Fan Guoxiang joined as well.32 Importantly, while the members shared the idea that
nuclear proliferation should be avoided, they varied in many aspects of NPT politics. For
example, participants in the Core Group included both those who opposed the indefinite exten-
sion of the treaty (e.g. Dhanapala, Taylhardat, Shaker, and Timerbaev), but also those who
worked towards that goal.
After the NPT’s indefinite extension, the Core Group was augmented with four new members
– South African diplomat Peter Goosen (the principal architect of the Decision on Principles and
Objectives adopted at the 1995 NPTREC), Australian diplomat Martine Letts, Sverre Lodgaard of
the UNIDIR, and the Peruvian diplomat Enrique Roman Morey. In 1998, the Core Group was
reconstructed once again. Three of the former members left (among them Jayantha Dhanapala,
who assumed the position of UN Under-Secretary-General of Disarmament Affairs), but six new
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ones joined, from both Western (e.g. Rolf Ekeus) and non-aligned countries (e.g. Iftekhar Zaman
and Raja Adnan).33 Furthermore, some of the original participants were replaced with others
from the same countries. In this way, Camille Grand became the “French” participant, Mahmoud
Karem became the “Egyptian” participant, and Grigory Berdennikov became the “Russian” repre-
sentative. The replacement of old members with new ones from the same countries was in line
with the idea that the most important countries should be represented in the group. Apart from
Simpson and Sanders, Harald M€uller was the only person who remained in the group from the
foundation till its end.
The composition assured some intellectual diversity in the group. The participants around the
table were from countries with differing and often opposing views on numerous non-prolifer-
ation issues. The group focused much less on nuclear disarmament than on nuclear non-prolifer-
ation (though disarmament was discussed, especially in terms of bans on testing nuclear
weapons, and US-Soviet [and later US-Russian] arms control initiatives). The group also did not
feature any member who openly opposed non-proliferation.
The meetings of the Core Group, throughout the PPNN’s duration, focused on the discussion
of substantive issues related to the latest developments of nuclear policy. While members fre-
quently stood on the opposing sides of political struggles, the minutes of the meetings show lit-
tle confrontation. This seems to fit the goal: to exchange views on the current substantive issues.
For example, the first meeting of the Core Group after the launch of the second phase of the
project, in 1991, featured a discussion about the procedural aspects of the 1995 NPTREC, a dis-
cussion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, an exchange of views on the first meeting of the Nuclear
Suppliers since the 1978 meeting of the London Club; a discussion on the Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone in Southern Africa; consequences of the Persian Gulf War for nuclear non-proliferation; and
a discussion about the consequences of the USSR’s collapse.34 Members often contributed with
observations based on discussions within the government of their country, the news, or aca-
demic texts. In later years, members also discussed reports commissioned by the PPNN (more on
publications below), or heard presentations from invited experts about ongoing research. By
doing so, the group assured that its members remained well informed, but also that they knew
the opinions of other governments and experts on the same substantive issues. Given that the
members of the Core Group were usually diplomats with the capacity to influence policy (or at
least speak to those who decided policy) in their home countries, this exchange enabled them
to garner new information and learn about how their counterparts viewed contemporary
developments.
Activities of the PPNN
The Core Group was; however, not the only one that benefitted from the PPNN – it was not
even the primary target of the PPNN’s benefits. Its aim being to inform the diplomats who deal
with non-proliferation in general, the PPNN used two main types of vehicles for its activities:
publications and conferences. Both publications and conferences helped the PPNN to advance
its goals of promoting the policy expertise of non-proliferation among diplomats, while also
maintaining the dominant position in the provision of credible information.
Publications
The provision of “authoritative information” was one of the original key goals of the PPNN. The
main vehicle for such provision were publications published by the PPNN, of which there were
two types: the first was the newsletter, Newsbrief, sent out initially biannually, later quarterly; the
other comprised more irregular PPNN publications such as Issue Briefs, Briefing Books, and
Occasional Papers.
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Newsbrief
The decision to publish Newsbrief was made during the first meeting of the Core Group in 1987.
The purpose of Newsbrief was to report on the Core Group meetings (in an abridged version), to
enhance the flow of information, and “[to act] as a clearing house for information, ideas, explana-
tions, and analyses.”35 It is important to mention that initially, the primary target audience of
Newsbrief were the members of the Core Group themselves. The goals of Newsbrief were to
inform the members of the Core Group, and to consolidate information for them, in between the
biannual meetings. In other words, Newsbrief was originally supposed to be an internally-directed
document, meant to keep members of the Core Group up to date, and be a trusted source of
verified, reliable information.
This internal focus, however, did not mean that the document was meant to be distributed
only to the members of the group. Given the PPNN’s outward focus, and its goal to inform pol-
icy practitioners around the world, the decision was made at the second meeting of the Core
Group to print out up to 1,000 copies of Newsbrief and request distribution lists from the IAEA,
UNIDIR, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for its further dissemination.36 This
print run quickly proved too small, and by the time of the 1995 NPTREC, Newsbrief was being
sent to 2,797 recipients in 117 countries.37
Newsbrief itself was relatively lengthy – prior to the 1995 NPTREC, it reached up to 20 pages;
although towards the end of the PPNN’s activities in the early 2000s, it was up to double that
length. Newsbrief opened with an editorial note. A section on topical developments followed: a
summary of news from all around the world, specifically regarding the international policy devel-
opments in all areas related to nuclear proliferation – from peaceful uses, to nuclear testing,
issues of disarmament and arms control, and to weapons-related technological developments
(similar to the overview of events found in the first pages of The Economist). The document also
contained a brief report on the PPNN’s activities (but not the summaries of meetings; these were
distributed as separate memos to the members of the Core Group only), an overview of recent
publications in the field, and an extensive overview of recently issued documents (such as IAEA
resolutions, important policy statements by the world’s leading statesmen, UN Security Council
resolutions, outcome documents of important intergovernmental negotiations, etc.). A brief sec-
tion with readers’ comments concluded the newsletter. These would bring attention to reports
in various languages, or provide new reinterpretations of the facts stated in earlier versions
of Newsbrief.
Strangely enough, despite being one of the PPNN’s main outreach activities, the publication
of Newsbrief was a one-man show. Sanders spent a significant portion of his time collecting and
systematizing information for Newsbrief. In doing so, he acted as both the gatekeeper but more
importantly as a systematiser of new information. Yet despite being the product of one man,
over time Newsbrief became a welcome and trusted document. With its broad distribution list, it
reached many countries where keeping abreast of developments in nuclear politics might have
been exceedingly difficult for diplomats working on NPT matters. Its main advantage was that it
provided a single source of issue-relevant news for policy professionals working in the domain of
nuclear non-proliferation. Newsbrief therefore became a source of expertise, since it provided a
comprehensive periodical overview of the main developments in the field.38
Other publications
In addition to Newsbrief, the PPNN aimed to also produce papers with more long-lasting rele-
vance. In the early years, the PPNN published eight Occasional Papers, which focused predomin-
antly on non-proliferation (although one of them focused on arms control verification,39 and one
on nuclear dynamics in Latin America40). Later, the PPNN facilitated publication of Issue Briefs
addressing major themes of global non-proliferation. Sanders and Simpson saw Issue Briefs as
opportunities to shape ongoing debates in nuclear politics. For example, in 1989, Sanders wrote
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a letter to Simpson complaining that Harald M€uller and Wolfgang K€otter were dragging their
feet about a paper commissioned from them by the PPNN. He argued that “waiting until next
autumn means that we cannot use the paper in conjunction with the review conference. [… ]
Do not let us forget that we are not talking about an academic paper but a peace [sic] of prac-
tical politics, treating an existing and urgent problem!” 41
Additionally, the PPNN published PPNN Briefing Books prior to the 1990 and 1995 NPTRECs –
documents containing the most important information; combining original documents and ana-
lysis in an accessible form for diplomats taking part in the NPT RevCons. Prior to the 1990 NPT
RevCon, about 350 copies of a two-volume Briefing Book were distributed to all important partici-
pants, including all heads of delegations, the conference secretariat, the IAEA, and participants of
past events. Prior to the 1995 NPTREC, the number increased to 560 copies. Briefing Books were
published from Southampton, mainly under the guidance of Simpson and his research
collaborators.42
By collecting and distributing information, the PPNN acted as a clearing house on information.
For example, in 1989, the PPNN commissioned a paper on peaceful nuclear explosions, which
was presented at one of the PPNN conferences by an outside expert.43 A few weeks later,
Sanders wrote to Simpson “[… ] Core Group was virtually unanimous in their criticism of the
[author’s] paper and several people said that without important substantive changes it would be
unsuitable for publication by PPNN [… ] I am still totally opposed [to the publication] (emphases
in original)”.44 The diversity of backgrounds and views within the Core Group provided a wide
scope of expertise, and also provided at least some protection against group think.
The publications allowed the PPNN to increase its presence in international settings, including
at the NPT RevCons, and thus augment the group’s ability to reach out to diplomats. In addition
to distributing the Briefing Books to participants, the PPNN also circulated other materials,
(including Issue Briefs and Newsbrief) produced by the Programme for participants, directly in the
meeting rooms, and to the media during the conferences.45 Prior to the 1990 NPT RevCon (the
first one during which the PPNN existed), the members of the Core Group even contemplated
lobbying delegations to “actively seek to play a direct role in shaping the outcome”.46 Although
PPNN did not ultimately act in this form, both Sanders and Simpson continued to provide infor-
mation (and publications) to delegations during the conference.47 At the same time, numerous
Core Group members would be included in (or even lead) their country’s delegations, which
enabled them to use the expertise, and also the social connections, to their advantage.
Conferences
Publications were meant to complement the PPNN conferences, in which the PPNN aimed at
improving the knowledge of diplomats taking part in the NPT Review Conferences. The first con-
ferences took place prior to the 1990 NPT RevCon. The PPNN held separate conferences for dip-
lomats from headquarters and from missions abroad (e.g. in Vienna and Geneva), in order to
capture two separate audiences. The diplomats from the headquarters were seen as those who
were more likely to take part in the RevCons themselves, but the diplomats accredited in Vienna
and Geneva were seen as being more likely to handle the pressing issues of the moment.48 The
PPNN’s first such conference (in 1989), organized again in Guernsey, was aimed at diplomats
working in headquarters, and attracted 37 participants from four continents.49 The participants
indeed covered the geographical span of the globe – there were participants from the
Communist Bloc (the USSR, the DPRK, Yugoslavia, Romania and East Germany), the Western Bloc,
as well as the non-aligned world (inter alia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Iran). Sixty-one countries
were invited for the second conference (aimed at diplomats based in Geneva), but only 36 took
part.50 These two conferences were primarily educational in purpose, and therefore were less
about policy coordination, and more about spreading information, and “informing” the
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 7
diplomats. In addition to the activities aimed at building subject expertise, the conferences were
generously padded with long breaks, lunches, cocktails, etc., in hopes that the diplomats would
use that time to meet one another, network, and socialize.51
The conference in Guernsey in May 1990 may serve as an illustration: the schedule included
sessions on peaceful uses and nuclear supply (chaired by David Fischer), regional issues (includ-
ing on WMD-free zones, chaired by Lewis Dunn), nuclear disarmament (chaired by Jayantha
Dhanapala), and a plenary session chaired by Mohamed Shaker. Chairs of the sessions, as well as
speakers, sometimes changed. For example, Harald M€uller would speak most of the time about
export controls, and Jayantha Dhanapala about disarmament, but experts such as Lewis Dunn
would switch between different themes. The final conference was held for the heads of delega-
tions shortly before the 1990 NPT RevCon, directly in Geneva – with a similar agenda, but con-
densed into one day.
Conferences between 1990 and 1995
The main bulk of the PPNN’s activities in spreading knowledge took place, however, prior to the
1995 NPTREC. The PPNN organized within this period two types of conferences – on one hand,
regional conferences in all parts of the world (Europe, South Asia, Northeast Asia, Latin America);
and on the other hand, larger conferences for diplomats from multiple world regions (these
were organized at Chilworth Manor near Southampton (1993), the Pocantico Center in
Tarrytown, NY (1994) and the Arden House in Harriman, NY (1995)). While the regional conferen-
ces were supposed to have a more regional focus, the themes they addressed were similar to
the larger conferences. One of the important differences was that the larger conferences expli-
citly targeted the NPT’s extension (so they would, e.g. talk about disarmament issues and the
extension of the NPT), whereas the regional conferences were more about the practical elements
of the NPT.
The regional conferences took place in 1992 and 1993. The first one was the “New Europe
and Nuclear Non-Proliferation” weekend seminar, organized near Frankfurt in May 1992, in
cooperation with the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.52 This workshop dealt with the situation
in the former USSR, non-proliferation threats in Europe and outside, the technical issues related
to safeguards and export controls, and Europe’s role in the NPT and its strengthening.
Participation was very high and prominent – virtually every foreign ministry in Europe was repre-
sented; usually at the level of political directors or ministerial advisors.
Workshops in Japan and in Sri Lanka (where India and Pakistan participated as well) attracted
a similarly high-profile and broad participation. The workshop aimed at East Asia looked at the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, disposal of highly-enriched uranium, but also fuel storage,
regional approaches to non-proliferation, and export control regimes; and was attended by rep-
resentatives of 10 countries.53 The workshops in Sri Lanka, targeting South Asia, were slightly
adjusted to ensure as wide a participation as possible – for example, to make sure that both
Indian and Pakistani participants attended, the workshop topic was “non-proliferation” instead of
the NPT, in which neither of the countries participated. Representatives from five regional coun-
tries took part in the workshop, in addition to the Core Group and the participants from inter-
national organizations and local think-tanks.54 A workshop in Caracas (Venezuela) aimed at
participants from Latin America, therefore featured an extra session on Argentina, Brazil, and the
ABACC, featuring Peruvian diplomat Enrique Roman Morey, Argentinian Julio Carasales, and
David Fischer.55 Speakers in these meetings included members of the Core Group, which by
then also included Czechoslovak expert Jirı Beranek, and Nigerian diplomat Oluyemi Adeniji.
Also noteworthy was the regional conference in Harare (Zimbabwe) in April 1993. The confer-
ence was the first event where South African officials met with other African countries to speak
about the country’s nuclear past.56 One of the South African officials was Waldo Stumpf, the
Chief Executive of the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, and the official in charge of
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the decommissioning of South Africa’s nuclear weapons. Stumpf’s brief intervention caused so
much interest in South Africa’s nuclear programme that organizers included an extra session for
Stumpf to do a presentation and answer questions from other participants.57 Participating UN
officials opined that no organization other than PPNN (non-governmental, yet respected) could
have brought the South Africans and the rest of Africa together for such discussions.58
The conferences addressed the diplomats’ subject-specific knowledge and skills by providing
information about technical aspects related to the treaty but also the most recent developments.
They also provided institutional knowledge by bringing together information about lessons from
nuclear-weapons-free zones or procedural information about upcoming conferences. But these
conferences allowed diplomats to develop relations with one another. Apart from the meetings
in Europe (where the rapprochement between former Cold War adversaries was well under way),
the regional meetings featured interactions between diplomats from countries which were not
always on positive terms. In Africa, this was seen in a rare interaction between South Africa’s for-
mer apartheid-era officials and diplomats from the rest of the continent; in South Asia this was
seen in the interaction between Indian and Pakistani diplomats; in East Asia this was seen in the
participation of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese diplomats; and in Latin America, there was a
regional exchange about the only recently ended competition between Argentina and Brazil.59
In addition to the regional conferences, larger conferences in 1993, 1994, and 1995 also pre-
pared diplomats for the NPTREC and gave them the opportunity to discuss issues that were
potentially the most conflictual. These conferences brought together diplomats from a larger
number of countries across all of the world’s regions. In the last two conferences, the keynote
lecture was given by the future president of the conference, Jayantha Dhanapala. The content
included substantive questions of procedural issues related to the extension of the treaty; the
question of review; the issue of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and regional issues. These con-
ferences not only included numerous leading members of the national delegations to the 1995
NPTREC,60 but also the original drafters of the Treaty – George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev.61
Senior officials from the UN, IAEA, and Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) participated as well. This gave speakers a convenient
opportunity to talk to many senior officials at the same time. Dhanapala, for example, used his
speech at the 1994 conference in Pocantico Hills as a test both to see how his ideas would be
received and to parse out the position of the participating diplomats’ states.62 Last but not least,
the PPNN organized nine informal lunches and three press briefings at the 1995 NPTREC to dis-
cuss progress at the conference among its members.63
Each of these events allowed for the build-up of subject-specific expertise, but also allowed
diplomats to discuss institutional developments – for example, procedural questions related to
the extension conference. However, since the PPNN conferences also included discussion about
possible scenarios for the conference (e.g. the discussion about whether the decision should be
taken by a vote or by consensus), they contributed to the development of institutional expertise.
One of the ways to limit the extent to which politics entered the PPNN conference discussions
was to have different speakers address individual topics. Panels at such conferences tended to
be composed of participants (members of the Core Group and outside experts) from different
countries, assuring that the information offered was not partial. For example, at the workshop in
1995, presentations on the extension of the Treaty were given by Sanders and George Bunn; pre-
sentations on security issues by Lewis Dunn, Jozef Goldblat and Oluyemi Adeniji; papers on
peaceful uses of nuclear energy were given by Djali Ahimsa (from Indonesia), David Fisher and
Jirı Beranek; and papers on regional issues by Mohamed Shaker, Yoshio Okawa (from Japan) and
Roland Timerbaev.64
If the discussions were biased, they were biased in that certain topics were discussed while
others were not.65 For example, already in its title the project signalled that it considered non-
proliferation as a virtuous goal, so there was never a discussion about the merits of non-prolifer-
ation. Similarly, anti-non-proliferation goals were not presented during the meetings. In a similar
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vein, the organizers and participants all agreed that the NPT was a treaty worth preserving.
Experts and diplomats from non-NPT members did not, generally, take part in the PPNN activities
(with the exception of the South Asia seminar in 1993).66 As discussed above, the Core Group
members differed on how long the extension should be, but both Sanders and Simpson believed
that the NPT should have been extended in 1995. This was somewhat similar to the NPT mem-
bership in general, where there was no party arguing for termination of the treaty at the end of
the 25-year period.67 Within these broad limitations, the content of the lectures was largely apol-
itical. However, the choice of topics clearly signalled that non-proliferation was a goal
worth pursuing.
Reinvention: The PPNN Post-1995
Immediately after the 1995 NPTREC, the PPNN organized (or co-organized) three post-mortem
events. The first one took place in June 1995 in Monterey, which was officially organized by the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute for International Studies (CNS), but at
which many PPNN members were present.68 In October 1995, the PPNN then organized two
back-to-back workshops in Chilworth Manor, which discussed nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East, and the consequences of the NPT’s extension. These events were attended by both Core
Group members and external experts. 69
Since the PPNN’s original mission had been oriented towards the 1995 NPTREC, the indefinite
extension in 1995 created a need for the organization to reinvent itself. The PPNN thus decided
to focus the group’s future activities on the interpretation and facilitation of implementation of
the decisions of the 1995 NPTREC, particularly related to the disarmament commitments
included in the documents adopted at the conference – the Decision on the Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and the Decision on Strengthening
the Review Process.70 The focus shifted slightly away from the initial “nuts-and-bolts” focus
towards discussion of NPT politics. Sanders in his letter to the Ford Foundation identified, in par-
ticular, six “urgent actions”:
consideration of procedural issues relevant to the implementation of the new review process; analysis of
substantive issues and possible solutions; the briefing of policy-makers and diplomats [… ]; dissemination of
ideas and information [… ]; provision of informal fora for officials to learn about each other’s positions [… ];
early consideration of new disarmament ‘yardsticks’ 71
In principle, however, the PPNN’s activities remained the same in terms of both the format
(publications and conferences) and approach (with the Core Group). The Core Group was, as dis-
cussed above, reconstructed in 1995 (slightly decreasing in size) and then in 1998 (expanding
slightly), and its biannual meetings continued.
The PPNN began its post-1995 transformation by focusing on the Decision on the
Strengthening the Review Process, and decided to aim its activities towards the 1997
Preparatory Committee conference ahead of the 2000 NPT RevCon, since this conference was
the first one where the Decision on Strengthening the Review Process, adopted at the 1995
NPTREC, was supposed to be put into practice.72
The two meetings for diplomats prior to the 1997 Preparatory Committee meeting were held
in the United States in October 1996 and March 1997.73 Approximately 40 diplomats took part in
these meetings, and as in the past, the format remained the same, with various panels chaired
by the PPNN Core Group members.74 These two meetings were also among the last ones organ-
ized by the PPNN alone. In 1997, the PPNN also started cooperating more closely with the CNS.
Although they organized a joint event in Kyiv in September 1996,75 their first major event was
the post-mortem of the 1997 Preparatory Committee organized in Monterey in April 1997.76 The
subsequent meeting for diplomats taking part in the 1998 Preparatory Committee was already
organized in cooperation with the CNS in Annecy at the end of February 1998.77 While the
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format with various panels remained, the PPNN Core Group’s members no longer led the individ-
ual sessions. A conference for participants in the 1999 Preparatory Committee was organized
(solely by the PPNN), and two conferences for the participants of the 2000 Review Conference
were organized in cooperation with the CNS.78 In June 2000, the PPNN and the CNS then co-
organized a postmortem conference of the 2000 Review Conference in Annecy.79 One important
post-1995 change was that the PPNN group stopped organizing regional seminars, with the
exception of one organized in November 1997 in Bangkok.80
It soon became apparent though – as the Ford Foundation had predicted – that the group
would wind down some of its activities after the 2000 NPT RevCon.81 In the late 1990s, the W.
Alton Jones foundation completely ceased its philanthropic funding for international security. In
1999, the funding from sources related to the Rockefeller family also ended, partly because arms
control was no longer considered a priority. “Funds were unusually short in the last round involv-
ing arms projects. So nothing was possible for PPNN,” wrote Wade Green (of Rockefeller Family
& Associates) to Sanders.82 In the third and fourth issues of Newsbrief of 2000, Sanders hinted at
financial troubles, mentioning applications for funding that had been submitted, and other
ongoing efforts at securing funding. In March 2001, he wrote in Newsbrief that funding had not
been secured.83 In April 2001, he also sent a letter out to the members of the Core Group that
due to the lack of funding, the activities of the Programme would have to change; distribution
of the publications would have to be more tailored to electronic means, and the Core Group
would meet only one last time.84 While the Ford Foundation provided additional bridge funding
to the PPNN, it was clear that the group’s end was near.85 The last meeting of the PPNN took
place during the workshop organized in 2002 in Annecy, France, again in cooperation with
the CNS.
While the PPNN has disappeared, a format emerged from it that can still be found, for
example, in CNS activities that bear a strong resemblance to the PPNN. The MIIS also started
developing its own nuclear transnational policy network in Central Asia, organizing conferences
for diplomats from newly independent states in Central Asia with funding from the Ford
Foundation and other foundations before the 1995 NPTREC.86 The project in Central Asia,
although conceived independently, closely resembled the PPNN – many experts taking part in its
events were affiliated with PPNN, and it even had its own “core group”.87 The CNS continues to
organize annual conferences in Annecy till today; and has developed training programmes in
both Monterey and the CNS’s offices in Vienna for new diplomats entering the field.
Assessment and Conclusion
Assessing whether the PPNN succeeded in its goals, and estimating the group’s impact, is diffi-
cult. There is no survey to rely upon, and measurable data is hard to come by. In a way, the
impact of groups such as the PPNN is similar to measuring the effects of nuclear deterrence –
scholars have numerous arguments, but measuring whether it is at play in any particular crisis is
very hard.88
It is similarly difficult to estimate the impact of the PPNN. The group was certainly distin-
guished by its broad membership (no other non-governmental group at the time had such a
broad membership), longevity (similar groupings tend to work for a period of less than 15 years),
regular nature of meetings, and high-profile nature of participation. This distinguished the PPNN
from other groups that tend to meet less frequently, include participants from certain countries
only (such as those focusing on the Middle East or US-Russian relations), or that focus explicitly
on policy advocacy.
It is also impossible to say that without the PPNN the NPT would not have been extended.
First of all, none of the NPT parties wanted the treaty to collapse,89 but more importantly, there
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was significant pressure from the United States, the European Union and Russia on countries to
support the indefinite extension of the treaty.
There were three fundamental ways in which the PPNN was by all accounts a significant
player. Firstly, the group filled a gap in the spreading of expertise. Already before the Review
Conference in 1990, the PPNN provided training to participants from Eastern European and
developing countries, where diplomats attending the event were often the sole people respon-
sible for the development of non-proliferation policy in their countries. When Sanders visited
Tehran, he was thanked for training the Iranian nuclear diplomats and asked for copies of the
most recent publications on non-proliferation beyond the ones published by the PPNN. The
PPNN then made copies and sent them to Tehran.90 Diplomats from more established countries
were also appreciative: the UK’s Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament T.A.H. Solesby,
for example, wrote that he was “sure this sort of preparatory informal seminar before a major
conference is of real practical value.”91 Warren Donnelly, a nuclear non-proliferation expert from
the Library of Congress, also wrote to Sanders, stating in 1990 that “the recent PPNN seminar for
diplomats in Geneva went splendidly. [… ] the high quality of its organization and presentation
entitle you both [i.e. Sanders and Simpson] to an enthusiastic ‘well done!’”92 The PPNN’s key role
was also recognized by the funders: the Ford Foundation wrote in its internal memo after the
NPTREC that PPNN was a “key actor” in the conference.93 In its post-1995 activities, the group
focused less on spreading expertise regionally, but still provided an encompassing introduction
for any newcomer to the field.
Secondly, by hosting regional seminars prior to the 1995 NPTREC that highlighted the import-
ance of the Treaty, the PPNN encouraged participation in the conference and provided opportu-
nities for networking among diplomats who would otherwise not have had the chance to meet.
One of the main concerns among diplomats leading up to the 1995 NPTREC was the lack of
attendance and the lack of attention given to the process by smaller countries,94 especially those
favouring indefinite extension; the fear was that these countries would simply skip the confer-
ence.95 By raising the profile and drawing attention to the conference, the PPNN helped to cre-
ate an environment where diplomats afforded more attention to the Treaty. A number of smaller
countries who did not attend the 1990 NPT RevCon then decided to attend the 1995 NPTREC
and participated in a PPNN regional meeting beforehand. Nepal, Panama, and Mauritius were
among such countries. It is difficult to attribute causality to the participation in a PPNN meeting,
especially since such countries were targeted by demarches by the US and the EU.96 However, it
is not difficult to imagine that such conferences highlighted the relevance of the treaty’s exten-
sion to the diplomats from smaller countries that might otherwise not have paid attention to it.
Furthermore, the bringing together of diplomats from dozens of countries gave them time and
space to interact with each other. For instance, at the first of the larger conferences in 1993 at
Chilworth Manor, Canadian diplomat Sven Jurschewsky met South African diplomat Peter
Goosen, and struck up a discussion about the possibility of cooperating on ensuring the NPT’s
indefinite extension. At least Jurchewsky later argued that this was a deliberate and premedi-
tated step, which was enabled by their joint participation in the meeting.97 The PPNN continued
to play this facilitating role even after the NPT’s indefinite extension.
Last but not least, the PPNN provided the President of the 1995 NPTREC, Jayantha Dhanapala,
with both expertise and social contacts, and thus helped him to prepare for stewardship of the
conference. For Dhanapala, the PPNN was doubly important. Thanks to the group, he was able
to meet and befriend leading diplomats from many countries, acquire up-to-date knowledge and
become a “household” name for diplomats and experts alike.98 This was not a trivial matter –
once Sri Lanka started promoting Dhanapala as a candidate, some countries within the Western
group considered him “not a sufficiently high-level candidate”,99 and Susan Burk, who was head-
ing the unit handling the NPT extension at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told
her Dutch and British colleagues that “neither Dhanapala nor Sri Lanka meet [the] requirement”
to nominate a conference president.100 Secondly, however, he was able to test the waters to see
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what other countries intended vis-a-vis the 1995 NPTREC. As he later confided during an oral his-
tory interview, the Sri Lankan government was not in a position to pay for his travel to the
world’s capitals to meet dignitaries and ask for their views.101 In the 21st century, it is not
uncommon for the incoming NPT RevCon President to visit 70, or even more, countries ahead of
the conference, but Dhanapala was unable to do so. The participation in the PPNN therefore
allowed them to come to him, and he was thus able to gauge their governments’ views. During
the conference itself, Dhanapala was able to consult with his PPNN friends. As he stated during
an oral history interview, “the group that was in the [PPNN] were also friends who had expert
knowledge of the subject, and so there was always expertise available to me through those
circles.”102 Sanders also served as Dhanapala’s informal and formal advisor during the confer-
ence, and was involved in the crafting and drafting of the formula that ultimately extended the
NPT indefinitely.103
These three points highlight why the PPNN’s story is worth studying in the 21st century: the
group’s working methods were appreciated; the meetings created opportunities for interaction;
and the conference’s president benefitted from the network personally. In this way, the PPNN
laid down the groundwork for the NPT’s extension.
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